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In an article entitled, "The Profit Motive" 1 Antony 
Flew defends the notion of a profit motive against 
those more socialistically minded persons who claim 
that such a motive is intrinsically selfish and 
immoral. Flew chooses as the main object of his attack 
the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle and in particu-
lar the latter*s discussion of trade and usury. In 
what follows, I will argue that Flew 1) has taken pas-
sages of Aristotle out of context, 2) has muddled the 
issue between himself and Aristotle, and 3) has failed 
to establish his own view. I will further provide a 
reading of Aristotle that is more accurate and philo-
sophically interesting than Flew's and thereby clarify 
the real issue between Flew and Aristotle. 
Flew claims that Aristotle's treatment of economics 
in the Politics is fraught with three misconceptions: 
1) whenever two parties make a trade of good or money 
one party benefits at the expense of the other, 2) 
usury is wrong, 3) there is a dichotomy between ac-
quisition for household use and acquisition for finan-
cial gain. I will deal with each of these in turn. 
To reveal the falsity of the first thesis, Flew 
quotes Aristotle's Politics: 
The natural form therefore of acquisition is al-
ways and in all cases, acquisition from fruits 
and animals. That art . . . has two forms: one 
which is connected with the management of the 
household. Of these two forms the latter is nec-
essary and laudible; the former is a method which 
is justly censured, because the gain in which it 
results is not naturally made, but is made at the 
expense of the other man. 2 
Flew's interpretation of this passage is: "Aristotle's 
point is that trade is in essence exploitation."* 
There are several problems with Flew's assessment. 
To begin with, it must be made clear that for Aristotle 
there were two kinds of trade; one kind he approved of 
and the other he claimed has led to much economic 
wrong.* Flew, in the above quote, leaves out the word 
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'retail* before the word 'trade' and would have us 
believe that Aristotle was antagonistic toward trade of 
any kind whatsoever. This is clear from what Flew says 
by way of elucidating his interpretation of Aristotle: 
"Aristotle thinks . . . the only credible acquisitions 
are those achieved from non-human nature direct."* Now 
the fi rst sentence of the passage Flew quotes does seem 
to support this assessment. But if we read Aristotle 
in context we see that he made an explicit affirmation 
of one kind of non-natural acquisition. In describing 
the development of society Aristotle says that the 
family developed: 
a kind of barter which is still practiced among 
barbarous nations who exchange with one another 
the necessaries of life and nothing more; giving 
and receiving wine, for example, in exchange for 
corn, and the like. This sort of barter is not 
part of the wealth-getting art and is not con-
trary to nature, but is needed for the satisfac-
tion of men's natural*wants.* 
What then can be said about this apparent contradiction 
in Aristotle's text? The heart of the problem lies in 
the first sentence from the passage Flew quotes, viz. 
the one that says that the natural form of acquisition 
is always from fruits and animals, i.e. from nature. 
There are several problems with this sentence. 
First, the translation Flew uses reads as follows: 
"The natural form, therefore, of the art of acquisition 
is always and in all cases, acquisition from fruits and 
animals." 7 But the phrase 'and in all cases' does not 
appear in the Greek text. The text reads: 
3iö Kaxct «fruuiv eoriv n xPHMaxIOTiKri naaiv ono T U V Kapn-
GvKai iGv £wwv .* The word 'naoiv1 is the Greek word 
for 'all' in this sentence and is the only part of this 
sentence from which the phrase in question could come. 
But 'all' or even 'always' surely is not equivalent to 
'always and in all cases'. 
The second problem is that the adverbial form of 
'all' is ' i i a V T u g ' not 'tiaoiv 1 . '-naaiv ' is rather a 
dative form and would probably be better rendered by, 
'to all', 'for all', or 'by all'. In fact, H. Rackham, 
who translates the Politics for the Loeb Classical Li-
brary does translate it this way: "Hence the business 
of drawing provision form the fruits of the soil and 
from animals is natural to all."' In spite of this 
however, some translators have translated 1 nooiv ' 
adverbially. For example, W. D. Ross renders the sen-
tence in question as follows: "Wherefore, the art of 
getting wealth out of fruits and animals is always 
natural." 1 0 Benjamin Jowett also translates it 
adverbially: "Wherefore the art of making money out of 
fruits and animals is always natural." 1 1 Now, there is 
a special usage of 'tm*j' in which it can accurately be 
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rendered by 'always* when it occurs in the neuter 
plural. And 'naoiv* is a dative plural that has iden-
tical masculine and neuter forms. So it is possible 
that Aristotle intended 'naoiv' to be neuter and the 
translation to read 'always' especially since there are 
other places where Aristotle does use 'naoiv ' 
adverbially. Nonetheless, I think a non-adverbial 
translation is more accurate and thus to be preferred. 
The third problem with this sentence is that even 
if we do translate 'naoiv' as 'always', the statement 
in and of itself does not say that such acquisitions 
are the only kind of acquisitions that are proper. We 
have to go to the rest of what Aristotle says to see, 
as Flew points out, that Aristotle took the intentions 
of nature to be normative. 
Thus I think Flew is relying on a questionable 
translation and it's quite possible that there is no 
contradiction in Aristotle at all. But even if Flew's 
translation were correct, there is a very natural way 
of interpreting the whole of Aristotle's discussion so 
as to eliminate the apparent contradition. We would 
say that Aristotle looks to acquisition from nature as 
the ideal form of acquisition that ought to be exempli-
fied whenever possible. Since pragmatic considerations 
prevent an exact imitation, we allow for a form of bar-
ter or trade. This interpretation would be supported 
by the fact that as one reads the three chapters in the 
Politics as a whole, it is unclear just how antago-
nistic Aristotle was toward even retail trade. It 
looks like Aristotle's only real enemy is usury. Thus, 
even working with the translation Flew uses, there is 
an interpretation of Aristotle that would eliminate the 
apparent contradiction. But unfortunately, Flew does 
not recognize the problem his translation has with the 
rest of Aristotle's discussion. Rather, he chooses to 
ignore this problem and give us an oversimplified and 
inaccurate account of Aristotle's position. 
Another problem with Flew's claim that Aristotle 
thought trade was always exploitative, is the fact that 
retail trade was not inherently wrong for Aristotle. 
Aristotle certainly disliked retail trade and thought 
that it had led to many wrongs. But he does not say 
that it is inherently wrong. In fact, when describing 
the development of society he gives a rather different 
outlook on retail trade: 
When the inhabitants of one country became more 
dependent on those of another, and they imported 
what they needed, and exported what they had too 
much of, money necessarily came into use. For 
the various necessaries of life are not easily 
carried about, and hence men agreed to employ in 
their dealings with each other something which is 
intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the 
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purposes of life, for example iron, silver and 
the like. 1 1 (emphases mine) 
And later he says: 
When the use of coin had once been discovered out 
of barter of necessary articles arose the other 
art of wealth-getting, namely, retail trade; 
which was at first probably a simple matter, but 
became more complicated as soon as men learned by 
experience whence . . the greatest profit might 
be made. 1 1 
And when Aristotle concludes his discussion of wealth-
getting he says: "For money was intended to be used in 
exchange, but not to increase at interest."1* For 
Aristotle, retail trade is not inherently wrong. If it 
could be restricted to the level of exchange, devoid of 
being vised to gain interest, there is textual evidence 
that Aristotle would have no qualms with it. Aris-
totle's real enemy seems to be usury, not retail trade. 
The last problem with Flew's assessment is that he 
has missed Aristotle's real point. As I stated ear-
lier, Flew claims that Aristotle's attack was aimed at 
the exploitative nature of trade. But I want to now 
argue that Aristotle's chief concern with usury and 
retail trade was not exploitation. In his description 
of usury in chapter nine, he makes it fairly clear that 
his opposition to this kind of wealth-getting is that 
it leads to a quality of life that is in conflict with 
the 'good life': "The origin of this disposition in 
men is that they are intent upon living only, and not 
upon living well." 1* Aristotle is arguing that in the 
practice of usury, money and/or its accumulation 
becomes an end in itself rather than a means to some 
other end. But we know from the Nichomachean Ethics 
that there is only one thing good in itself for Aris-
totle, viz. the good life (euöcnpovia) • The individual 
who practices usury has given up the good life for one 
of greed and consumption. He has lost sight of that 
for which he was made, his cpXov , and seeks a goal 
contrary to his nature. In chapter nine Aristotle 
tells us that when the individual takes up usury he ne-
glects to perform his societal tasks properly: 
The quality of courage, for example, is not in-
tended to make wealth, but to inspire confidence; 
neither is this the aim of the general's or phy-
sician's art; but the one aims at victory and the 
other at health. Nevertheless, some men turn ev-
ery quality or art into a means of getting 
wealth; this they conceive to be the end and to 
the promotion of the end they think all things 
must contribute. 1 4 
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So when the various individuals in society seek money 
as an end rather than euöctipovia they contribute to-
ward the general decline of the society, people become 
inconsiderate of their fellow citizens and are just as 
likely to cheat them as not. A craftsman produces 
goods, the quality of which is of little concern to 
him, as long as it brings him a nice return. So he not 
only is prevented from obtaining the good life himself, 
but is also preventing his fellows from obtaining it, 
thus contributing to the decline of society. For 
Aristotle society is given by nature and whatever con-
tributes to its decline is, ipso facto, an enemy of na-
ture. Exploitation in this scenario is of only sec-
ondary importance. The chief concern is the good life 
and the preservation of society, both of which are 
natural. 1 7 
According to Flew, Aristotle's second misconception 
is his belief that usury is wrong. Flew tells us that 
Aristotle's argument against usury is that money, i.e. 
pieces of metal, can not have progeny, but this is pre-
cisely what usury does, it makes money breed itself. 
Usury then is unnatural and therefore wrong. Aristotle 
does present this line of reasoning" and while it was 
not so strange to the Athenian ear, 1' it certainly is 
strange to us. But as I have just argued, Aristotle 
had another, more interesting reason for claiming that 
usury was in opposition to nature, viz. that it leads 
to a poor quality of life. This reason is not so 
strange to us. And if Flew had taken it up he might 
have been more successful against Aristotle. As it is, 
Flew's objections fall short: 
For a sum of money is the substantial equivalent 
of any of the goods or collections of goods which 
it might buy. There can, therefore, be nothing 
obnoxiously unnatural about receiving a money re-
turn upon an investment in money, unless it would 
be equally obnoxious and unnatural to ask for 
some return either in money or kind for the use 
of the goods themselves. 2 0 
But this is no reply to Aristotle. For, even though 
Aristotle offers no discussion on the charging of rent, 
it is likely that he would say that charging rent for 
goods borrowed is just as wrong as charging interest 
for money borrowed. Toward the end of his article. 
Flew offers his only defense for the charging of rent: 
11 . . it is hard to see how one could defend the total 
rejection in principle of the acceptance of rent for 
the use of (private) property if once one had conceded 
any right to (private) property at all." 2 1 But this 
still will not do. Aristotle may just claim that the 
sole right of private property is possession and this 
grants no further right of charging rent. 
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Flew ignores Aristotle's interesting attack on 
usury, and thus operates with an overly simplistic 
conception of what 'nature' means for Aristotle. And 
this confusion renders his project unsuccessful. If 
Flew wants to refute Aristotle, he must do one of three 
things: 1) show that Aristotle's view of nature is in-
correct and usury is at least not contrary to it, or 2) 
affirm Aristotle's notion of nature and show his notion 
of usury to be incorrect, or 3) show that just because 
something is unnatural does not necessarily mean that 
it is inappropriate. But Flew has done none of these. 
The most Flew does in this regard is to point out that 
Aristotle's view of natvtre leads him to some unusual 
claims, viz. that slavery and war are in accord with 
nature. These claims may raise doubts as to the credi-
bility of Aristotle's concept of nature, but they do 
not, in and of themselves, justify a wholesale rejec-
tion of Aristotle's view of nature. Nor do they esta-
blish that usury is somehow in accord with nature. 
Another problem with Aristotle's second alleged 
misconception is that Flew implies that Aristotle 
wanted to abolish money and that such abolition would 
make men less selfish: "The abolition of money might 
make us less mercenary. It would not by itself begin 
to make us less materialistic or less competitive." 2 1 
In the three chapters under consideration, Aristotle 
simply does not say he wants to abolish money. In 
fact, as we have seen, he appears to favor a certain 
restricted use of it. What Aristotle did want to abol-
ish was usury. But he made no claim that such aboli-
tion would make people less materialistic or 
competitive. What he does claim is that its abolition 
would help make possible the good life and the good so-
ciety. 
The third Aristotelian misconception that Flew dis-
cusses comes from Aristotle's dichotomy between acqui-
sition for financial gain and acquisition for household 
use. Flew says: "The antithesis is false for the very 
reason that there can be no profit in producing what no 
one has any wish to buy, and presumably, to use." 2 1 
Now Aristotle says that, " . . the art of household 
management must either find ready to hand, or itself 
provide, such things necessary to life, and useful for 
the community of the family or state . . " 2* But 
Aristotle's emphasis in this chapter is clearly on the 
needs of the house rather than on things that are use-
ful. Says Aristotle, "Property, in the sense of a bare 
livelihood, seems given by nature herself to all . . " 2* 
And even though Aristotle talks of the householder ac-
quiring things both necessary and useful he is using 
'useful' in a" different sense than Flew is. For 
Aristotle, the householder's acquisitions have a limit: 
"for the amount of property which is needed for a good 
life is not unlimited . . . " 2 S Thus he can not be us-
ing 'useful' in the broad sense Flew is, where just 
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anything can have some use. What qualifies as useful 
for Aristotle are things that can be used to get what 
is needed. Thus I think we can read Aristotle's dicho-
tomy as one between acquisition (or trade) of necessary 
items and acquisition (or trade) of unnecessary items 
for the purpose of making a profit. Perhaps, as Flew 
says, there is no dichotomy between useful things and 
profitable things. But, at least on one sympathetic 
reading, Aristotle claims to make no such dichotomy. 
Rather, his is between necessary items and profitable 
ones. And this dichotomy does not seem to be a false 
one at all. 
Nothing I have said in the foregoing commits me to 
a rejection of Flew's claim that usury is morally per-
missable, or to the acceptance of Aristotle's claim 
that usury ought to be censured. What I am committed 
to is the claim that Flew's interpretation of Aristotle 
is inaccurate, that this inaccuracy confuses the real 
issues between Aristotle and Flew, and that Flew fails 
to adequately establish his own view. I have also 
claimed that I have provided a more accurate, charita-
ble, and philosophically interesting interpretation 
which clears the waters Flew has muddied and makes it 
possible to see what the real issue is between Aris-
totle and Flew. This interpretation yields the follow-
ing scenario. Flew favors usury for the reason that it 
is much like the practice of charging rent which in 
turn is simply one of the rights of private property. 
I have suggested that Aristotle could give a ready 
response to this argument, viz. that the sole right of 
private property might only be possession. Aristotle 
dislikes usury, ultimately, because it decreases one's 
quality of life and contributes toward the disintegra-
tion of society. Now let me suggest that Flew no doubt 
has a ready response to Aristotle, viz. that usury, in 
fact increases one's quality of life and contributes 
toward the preservation of society. Taking up the de-
bate suggested by this scenario is the topic of another 
paper, viz. the paper Flew should have written. 
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